Psychology and Philosophical Intuitions by Durwin, AJ
Colonial Academic Alliance 
Undergraduate Research Journal 
Volume 1 Article 3 
2010 
Psychology and Philosophical Intuitions 
AJ Durwin 
Hofstra University, adurwi1@pride.hofstra.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/caaurj 
Recommended Citation 
Durwin, AJ (2010) "Psychology and Philosophical Intuitions," Colonial Academic Alliance Undergraduate 
Research Journal: Vol. 1 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/caaurj/vol1/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Colonial Academic Alliance Undergraduate Research Journal by an authorized editor of W&M 
ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
Evolutionary psychology is an approach to psychology, in which knowledge and 
principles from evolutionary biology are put to use in research on the structure of 
the human mind.  
-Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, “Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer” 
Heading a philosophy paper with a quotation from two psychologists may 
seem strange until one realizes the potential analogy between psychology and 
epistemology. Similarly to Cosmides’ and Tooby’s view of evolutionary 
psychology, I view cognitive and evolutionary epistemology as an approach to 
the respective discipline, an approach I advocate. I believe that the approach can 
provide unique and philosophically interesting insights into the philosophers’ 
methodology. It helps to uncover why philosophers reason the way they do, when 
they are likely to err, and how they can avoid the errors. In order to make sense of 
such an approach, one has to do some philosophical and psychological work. So 
in this paper, I focus on applying a cognitive and evolutionary epistemological 
approach to a contemporary philosophical debate. I introduce a common mental 
strategy (i.e. the availability heuristic, to be discussed later) which Amos Tversky 
and Daniel Kahneman first elucidate in their article “Availability: A Heuristic for 
Estimating Probability.” I then analyze how it affects the use of intuitions in 
philosophy, expanding on the work of Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols, and 
Stephen Stich in their article “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions”. They 
provide research data suggesting that intuitions may be culturally relative and I 
draw conclusions about what that might mean for the way philosophers use 
intuitions, either narrowing conclusions or forcing philosophers to control for 
various troublesome causes of intuitions. I hope that my discussion demonstrates 
the effectiveness and usefulness of cognitive and evolutionary epistemology and 
helps to inspire a sustained interest in evolutionary and cognitive psychology and 
their philosophical implications.  
Psychological Findings 
Focusing on a particular heuristic (i.e. problem solving strategy) I now hope to 
unveil some hidden biases that haunt philosophy. First, consider: Of all dogs 
everywhere, what percentage are Golden Retrievers? Even if we ignore the 
potential difficulties of borderline cases (i.e. all but one of a dog’s grandparents 
were Golden Retrievers), this question is still not very easy to answer. One way 
we might attempt to solve this puzzle is to think of all the dogs we can remember 
and ask ourselves ‘of all the dogs I can remember, what percentage were Golden 
Retrievers?’ Unfortunately, while this may give us a relatively accurate picture of 
the proportion of Golden Retrievers to other kinds of dogs that we have 
encountered, it seems unlikely that our experiences are representative of all the 
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world’s dogs. If you live in a well-to-do western society (like me), being in such a 
location very well might bias our data set (i.e. all the dogs we can remember). For 
example, we are considerably more likely to see rare and expensive purebreds 
here than in many other poorer areas where there still happen to be many dogs 
(e.g. many parts of India). The way people go about approximating frequency and 
probability is the focus of much psychological investigation. To achieve a better 
understanding of the phenomena, how people make their estimates, when people 
are likely to err, and how people can correct those errors, one must consider the 
primary psychological literature, starting with Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman. 
Tversky and Kahneman, in their article “Availability: A heuristic for 
judging frequency and probability”, discuss how people often estimate “the 
frequency of a class or the probability of an event” (164). A fast and easy 
approach that people often employ to form such estimates is to judge “the ease 
with which instances or associations could be brought to mind” (164). Tversky 
and Kahneman call this economical style of reasoning “the availability heuristic” 
(164). The availability heuristic utilizes the ease with which one can remember 
instances or imagine scenarios “as a basis for the judgment of frequency” (164). 
However, while the availability heuristic may be quite useful in practical 
circumstances because “in general, frequent events are easier to recall or imagine 
than infrequent ones” (164), there are other factors, besides actual frequency, 
which can affect the ease with which one can remember or imagine an instance or 
a scenario. Therefore, in certain domains, when ease of recall and imaginability 
are not positively correlated with frequency or probability, “the use of the 
availability heuristic leads to systematic biases” (164). Such biases leave many 
people fallaciously inferring over-generalized conclusions from a relatively small 
or misleading data set. 
 Tversky and Kahneman demonstrate the systematic biases in their 
research subjects, which they propose are a result of the availability heuristic. 
When asked to estimate the frequency of words beginning with the letter ‘R’ or 
having ‘R’ in the third position, a majority of research subjects “judged the first 
position to be more likely” (167). However, there are actually more words with R 
in the third position than with R in the first. These results were replicated with 
other consonants (K, L, N, V) which are also more likely to be in the third 
position of a word than the first, but every time, a majority of the participants 
erroneously think there are more words beginning with the letters than having 
them in the third position. Tversky and Kahneman suggest that participants might 
be misestimating the number of words containing the letters in the first or third 
positions due to the availability heuristic and the way human memory works. It is 
“easier to think of words that start with [some particular letter] than words where 
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[the letter] is in the third position” (166), so if people utilize the availability 
heuristic, which implicitly assumes that the ease of recall positively correlates 
with frequency, then people will often misestimate the frequency of words 
beginning with some letter and containing the letter in the third position. 
 Tversky and Kahneman suggest that particularly salient memories may 
negatively affect one’s ability to estimate frequencies or probabilities. An 
example is “a temporary rise in the subjective probability of [a car] accident” 
(178) right after one has seen an accident. Furthermore, the availability heuristic 
relies on memory to be a representative sample of the frequency of instances. If a 
particular kind of event is over or under-represented in memory, then one may 
judge it to be more or less frequent than it actually is. Seeing news stories about 
murder every day on the evening news (‘if it bleeds it leads’) may increase the 
representation of murder in one’s memory and may thus increase one’s estimation 
of the frequency of murder. Even if relatively few United States citizens are 
actually murdered (i.e. less than a hundredth of one percent of all people in the 
US in 2008 according to the FBI’s annual crime report), one may estimate a 
higher murder rate due to how available instances of murder are in one’s memory.  
 Relying on the availability heuristic, even when one does not have a 
representative sample in memory, may be a legacy of humans’ shared ancestral 
history. The human brain, where data processing including the use the availability 
heuristic occurs, is an evolved organ. As Steven Pinker elucidates in his book 
How the Mind Works, in order to operate effectively in practical circumstances, 
the brain must make some “tacit assumptions about the world” (346). For 
example, because human sensory perception makes assumptions about the world, 
humans tend to fall victim to a wide array of optical illusions when the perceptual 
assumptions which natural selection has instilled in humans are violated. We 
make inferences about a 3-dimensional (i.e. 3-D) world around us based on 
assumptions about the way light will bounce off of 3-D objects and arrange itself 
on our 2-D retina.  For example, when humans look at a television, they tend to 
see the shapes on the screen as filling into some 3-D world (i.e. people perceive 
width, height, and depth). Some things appear to be in front of or behind other 
things, even though actually all the shapes are merely composed of differently 
colored arrays of 2-D pixels. Human perceptual systems tend to assume that if 
objects (or patterns of color) appear to overlap each other, then one is in front of 
the other.  
In a similar way, human patterns of reasoning tend to make assumptions 
that, when violated, leave humans unable to easily come to correct conclusions. In 
our ancestral history (roughly 100,000 years ago), it may have been useful to 
assume that one’s memory was representative of frequency for most practical 
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concerns. For example, if one of our ancestors wondered about how likely he was 
to get bit by a poisonous snake while hunting, he may very well have inferred 
something close to the actual probability if he had had a decent memory of every 
time someone in his tribe had been bitten while hunting in the past. If our ancestor 
had remembered the number of people who had hunted, and that one person had 
gotten bit per week, or one per year, or one per decade, then our ancestor could 
have formed a relatively accurate judgment of his chances of being bit. This is 
how the availability heuristic could have been quite useful and therefore how it 
could become prevalent in the gene pool. This is not to say that the availability 
heuristic definitely evolved for this reason – that is an open empirical question – 
but we can see that the success of the availability heuristic hinges on the scope of 
the conclusions that one draws from one’s memory. In our ancestral history, 
humans may have only been seeking local conclusions (e.g. How likely am I to 
fall victim to a snake bite right here?) as opposed to global conclusions (e.g. How 
likely is one to fall victim to a snake bite anywhere on earth?). Such an account of 
the availability heuristic explains why it is so tempting, and why it tends to lead 
people into error in certain contexts.  
Philosophical Implications 
I propose that the availability heuristic, and the systematic biases that come with 
it, might endanger some philosophical projects if any philosophers use the 
availability heuristic to estimate a frequency or probability and their memory is 
not representative of the actual frequency or probability. After all, as Tversky and 
Kahneman point out in their article “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases”: “the reliance on heuristics and the prevalence of biases are not restricted 
to laymen” (1130).  
An example of such a problematic philosophical project is reliance upon 
intuition to support a theory. One might rely on ‘our’ intuitions to support some 
claim/theory about a particular concept. However, if there is a substantial portion 
of the population which does not share that intuition, then the argument will fall 
on deaf ears and will hold no water for that substantial portion of the population. 
Furthermore, if the intuitions vary from person to person, they may vary for 
arbitrary reasons, leaving one to wonder why one ought to pay special attention or 
give more weight to any one of the intuitions in question. 
An example of a philosophical project resting almost entirely on 
questionable intuition assumptions is Edmund Gettier’s paper “Is Justified True 
Belief Knowledge?” In his article, Gettier responds to the traditional 
understanding of knowledge which extends back as far as Plato’s Theaetetus. 
More recently, A.J. Ayer and Roderick Chisholm elucidate the three traditional 
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criteria for knowledge which Gettier sums up as justified true belief. However, 
Gettier claims that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge because “it 
is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact 
false” (444). Gettier proposes that chance events can turn a justified false belief 
into a justified true belief using a thought experiment about Smith, a man 
applying for a job. Smith has “strong evidence” (445) that the other applicant, 
Jones, will get the job (maybe the boss told Smith) and that Jones has ten coins in 
his pocket (maybe Smith saw Jones counting them). Accordingly, Smith believes 
that “(e) the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket” (445). Yet, 
Smith gets the job, not Jones, and unbeknownst to Smith, he too has ten coins in 
his pocket.  
According to Gettier, although Smith thought Jones would get the job, 
events just so happened to make his belief (e) true and justified. Therefore, Gettier 
asserts that one can have justified true belief while “it is equally clear” (445) that 
the belief is not sufficient for knowledge (i.e. the Gettier problem). However, it is 
unclear what Gettier meant by “clear”; he seems to be referring to an epistemic 
intuition, i.e. an impulsive response to the thought experiment. Gettier uses his 
intuition, that Smith does not have knowledge, to support his claim that a justified 
true belief is not a “sufficient condition for someone’s knowing a given 
proposition” (446). 
 However, if Gettier’s intuition about whether or not Smith has knowledge 
happens not to be representative of many other people’s intuitions, then his whole 
project may be misguided, or at the very least, quite overstated in that it may only 
capture what knowledge is for some small subset of the population. There is cause 
for concern because Gettier may be merely assuming his intuition is 
representative of most people’s intuition because his intuition is particularly 
salient and available in memory, potentially due to the fact that the limited 
number of people he encounters also happen to share his intuition. He may be 
falling victim to the availability heuristic and the ensuing biases, which seem to 
be tempting Gettier to fallaciously over-generalize his intuition onto the rest of the 
population of English speakers. 
  Furthermore, it seems like any attempt to analyze a concept based on 
some intuitive response to a thought experiment is likely to fall into the same trap. 
For example, one may formulate some theory to make sense of several intuitions 
that one has in response to several thought experiments. But then one may come 
to find out that one’s intuitions are not universally shared or worse, they are the 
minority intuitions. In such a scenario, one’s whole chain of reasoning and the 
theory hoping to make sense of some group of intuitions ultimately cannot get off 
the ground if the theorist hopes to make a universal claim which applies to 
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everyone. At the very least the theorist must back off from the more general claim 
and adopt a much narrower claim, which specifies that the argument only holds 
for those who share the intuitions. A limited conclusion is necessary because the 
arguments the theorist presents, which rely a series of intuitions in response to 
thought experiments, will not hold any significance for a substantial portion of the 
population. One will probably have a hard time convincing an audience of a 
theory if the method one uses appeals to intuitions which the audience does not 
share. For example, if a philosopher presents a thought experiment in order to 
foster some intuition in the mind of the audience and from there he/she argues in 
favor of some ethical theory, and the thought experiment leaves the audience with 
some other intuition, then the audience will lack motivation for accepting the 
ethical theory.  
Unfortunately, Gettier is hardly the only philosopher to utilize intuitions in 
such a manner. In the past 20 years, at least 10 articles contained in JSTOR 
explicitly hope to tackle the Gettier problem and reference the Gettier Problem in 
their titles. All of these articles run the risk of building upon the faulty foundation 
which Gettier set out, because he bases his argument primarily on an over-
generalized intuition. Also unfortunately, the erroneous reliance upon intuition in 
philosophy is not limited to the conceptual analysis of knowledge. 
 The ‘experimental philosophers’, Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols, and 
Stephen Stich, in their paper “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions,” question 
such uses of intuition to support philosophical theory, using intuition to mean “a 
spontaneous judgment about the …properties of some specific case” (5). They 
propose that “a fair amount of what goes on in…epistemology can be classified as 
[utilizing intuition to support theory]” (8). Weinberg et al. actually take the 
trouble to get an accurate picture of people’s intuitions, rather than relying on the 
availability heuristic, only to find systematic differences in people’s intuitions 
about the concept of knowledge. They conducted research asking participants to 
judge whether individuals in particular cases have knowledge. This empirically 
oriented philosophical project is known as ‘experimental philoosphy’. For the 
Gettier case, Weinberg et al. discovered large and systematic differences between 
Westerners and East Asians; Westerners tended not to call the Gettier cases 
examples of knowledge, while the East Asians did. Perhaps even more surprising, 
Weinberg et al. found large and systematic differences between people of high 
socioeconomic status and people of low socioeconomic status, when the 
participants were asked whether individuals in different cases have knowledge. 
When ascribing knowledge to individuals in different thought experiments, 
compared to people of low socioeconomic status, people of high socioeconomic 
status tend to require that the individual have more evidence. 
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Ernest Sosa attempts to defend the use of intuitions in philosophy in his 
article “Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition.”  Sosa doubts that 
the experiments in question adequately support the hypothesis that “there really 
are philosophically important disagreements rooted in cultural and socioeconomic 
differences” (235). He acknowledges that there are prima facie differences but 
suggests that they may be merely “verbal” (235). Sosa indicates that if the 
differences are merely verbal and if one found a way to clarify the verbal 
confusion, then people may still share the same intuitions. Weinberg et al. 
acknowledge this possibility (as well as the possibility of other confounding 
variables) but maintain that the experiments have “at least shifted the burden of 
argument well over in the direction of the defender [of the use of intuitions in 
philosophy]” (14). Sosa proposes an alternative testable hypothesis in order to 
cast doubt on the validity of the experiments which Weinberg et al. perform, 
namely that verbal differences account for the entirety of different cultures’ 
answers to questions about whether someone has knowledge in various 
circumstances. However, if the experimental philosopher acknowledges the 
possibility of an alternative hypothesis, it seems like he or she would recommend 
testing this alternative hypothesis, as opposed to assuming that it is true and that 
intuitions are just as reliable a source of evidence as philosophers ever thought 
they were.  To test this hypothesis, one would have to investigate some intuition 
while controlling for verbal disagreement as much as possible. An experimenter 
could achieve this if the experimenter stipulates definitions of key words and tests 
whether other variables, besides geographical location, affect intuitions. For 
example, one could ascertain whether or not the ordering of questions affects 
intuitive judgment (i.e. whether there is an ordering effect; Swain et al. do just 
such an investigation which we will consider below).  
Furthermore, even if someone performed new experiments and found that 
Sosa’s alternative hypothesis is true, I propose that it would still have a dramatic 
impact on the use of intuitions in philosophy. At the very least it would force 
philosophers to limit their conclusions and back off the universal claims which are 
supposed to appeal to everyone. Instead, as Weinberg at al. explain, philosophers 
would be partaking “in a culturally local endeavor” (36) of theorizing about and 
making sense of the intuitions of some subset of the population.  
Sosa attempts to defend the use of intuitions in another way as well. After 
acknowledging the ordering effect which Stacey Swain, Joshua Alexander, and 
Jonathan Weinberg demonstrate in their article “The Instability of Philosophical 
Inuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp,” Sosa insists that “such contextual 
factors” (237) only cast doubt on intuition “in the sort of way” (237) that they cast 
doubt on perception. Sosa concludes that “we have to be careful in how we use 
intuition” (237) but that some uses of intuition may be acceptable. This is right in 
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line with the goals of the experimental philosopher who wants to caution his or 
her audience about the ways that intuitions can be misleading. As Joshua Knobe 
and Shaun Nichols indicate in their article “An Experimental Philosophy 
Manifesto,” the question to ask about any particular intuition which one hopes to 
use in an argument is “can the intuition be trusted [italics in the original]?” (8). 
They draw an analogy between philosophical intuitions and a child’s religious 
belief: both assertions come into doubt if one realizes that they are largely a 
product of one’s “cultural upbringing” (11), and that it is merely an “accident that 
[one] had the cultural upbringing that [one] did” (11). This analogy forces one to 
wonder if one’s intuitions are really the most accurate way of understanding the 
world, i.e. do they map well onto reality, or are they just as arbitrary as different 
cultures’ religious practices/ beliefs, which might have an interesting historical 
explanation but ultimately do not seem to be accurately tracking reality.  
Even if intuitions are as reliable as sensory perception, I propose that the 
experiments could still teach many philosophers an important lesson which would 
impact the way they use intuitions. Just as a scientist would control for any 
expected individual differences when conducting an experiment, the philosopher 
may feel the need to control for those things which affect intuitions in a way that 
the philosopher did not intend (e.g. an ordering effect) if the philosopher is 
attempting to draw a general conclusion from the intuitions. For example, 
consider a biologist who is investigating courtship/mating behavior and timing the 
dance-like moves of the blue-footed booby on one of the islands of the Galapagos. 
Consider how the biologist might respond if he/she comes to realize that he/she is 
actually color blind and that people tend to be awful at keeping time mentally. 
The biologist would acknowledge that he/she may have mixed up the blue-footed 
booby with the red-footed booby due to his/her color blindness, and he/she may 
not have been timing the booby’s dance accurately due to the human tendency to 
deviate from perfect time keeping. The biologist, in such a situation, may ask 
someone else, who is not color blind, to verify the color of the booby’s feet, and 
the biologist may bring a stopwatch to keep track of time. These considerations 
suggest the importance independent and objective verification.  
Bringing the point back to intuitions, if a philosopher has reason to believe 
that one’s intuitions may be deviating from reality, i.e. something other than the 
truth of the intuitions causes one to have the intuition, then the philosopher may 
want to control for the various interfering factors like culture and ordering. To do 
this, the philosopher may have to seek the help of others who do not share the 
same cultural upbringing or who did not first consider the thought experiments in 
the same order. This is exactly what experimental philosophy strives to do in 
order to keep philosophers cautious, so that they do not over-generalize, or 
assume that their intuitions are reliable sources of information which accurately 
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track truth, when in fact the intuitions may be just products of several arbitrary 
causes. 
 The availability heuristic explains why philosophers might be tempted to 
overestimate the frequency of their own intuitions in the population at large. 
Furthermore, it suggests why it can be dangerous to build a case for a particular 
philosophical theory of a concept if one relies on an intuitive foundation. Such a 
philosophical theory only stands as a theory of some universal concept if one 
supposes that the intuition is nearly universal among people. Recognizing the 
availability heuristic as a psychological phenomenon assists the experimental 
philosopher (e.g. Weinberg et al.) because with it one can help victims of its bias 
recognize and overcome the temptation to project their own intuitions onto the 
population at large.  
Furthermore, rather than just using empirical data to contradict the 
philosophers who over-generalize their own intuitions, the availability heuristic 
explains why one over-generalizes in the first place. It also indicates how one can 
alleviate the problem, i.e. one can either be extraordinarily careful when using 
intuitions in an argument, being sure that one’s conclusions do not extend beyond 
one’s evidence and that one has controlled for the various effects which 
complicate intuitions, or one can try to argue for one’s conclusion without relying 
on intuitions but rather calling for pragmatic, empirical, or some other kind of 
consideration. A strong understanding of the problem may be the best way to 
search for a cure. Rather than treating the symptom, the experimental philosopher, 
equipped with psychological understanding (i.e. recognizing the availability 
heuristic), can treat the cause.  
Conclusion 
Researchers in this tradition clearly share a set of assumptions: the ecological 
validities are probably high, the heuristics are generally useful, but common and 
profoundly important exceptions are to be found. 
-Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction to Heuristics and Biases: The 
Psychology of Intuitive Judgement 
Because this paper opened with a quotation from a pair of psychologists, it 
seems fitting for it to end with another such quotation. This particularly insightful 
comment indicates how the most prominent researchers of human judgment think 
that a cognitive and evolutionary perspective can illuminate and bring together, in 
one coherent view, generally successful human reasoning, occasional mistakes, 
and the hope for improvement. The cognitive and evolutionary epistemologist can 
still hope to uncover how people reason and how people can improve their 
9
Durwin: Psychology and Philosophical Intuitions
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2010
reasoning. Cognitive and evolutionary psychology shed light on the way 
philosophers reason in a variety of ways. They indicate how philosophers tend to 
reason and why philosophers reason that way. Furthermore, they indicate the 
systematic ways that philosophers are likely to make mistakes of reasoning, and 
provide possible ways to overcome the mistakes. So, while humans’ heuristics 
(i.e. mental problem solving strategies) may be generally fairly well suited to day 
to day practical life, there are also some situations which often lead us into error. 
Falling victim to such mistakes of reasoning may be particularly tempting because 
of how effective the human heuristics are in other general circumstances. As we 
have seen in respect to the philosophical use of intuitions, cognitive and 
evolutionary epistemology, if used efficiently, can help one to overcome 
temptation in such problematic circumstances. 
Specifically, I have shown why philosophers are so tempted to assume that 
their intuitions generalize to the population at large (i.e. the availability heuristic). 
Furthermore, I have proposed the relevance of experimental philosophy, which 
does not rely on the availability heuristic, but rather conducts survey’s to 
determine what people’s intuitions are and what affects them. Finally, my original 
contribution to the debate is a suggestion about how to interpret the survey 
findings. I recommend that philosophers consider the data before attempting to 
utilize intuitions in philosophical arguments for two reasons. First, if philosophers 
are relying on an intuition that others are unlikely to share, any arguments based 
on the intuition are likely to be unmotivated for all those who do not share the 
intuition. Secondly, if a philosopher still wants to rely on her intuitions, she may 
feel obliged to proceed as a scientist would, limiting her conclusions which only 
apply to those who share her intuitions, and controlling for any factors that might 
cause her intuitions to vary for arbitrary reasons, like the order in which she 
considered the various thought experiments, and her socio-economic status.  
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